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Abstract
Competitive pressure affects a wide spectrum of decisions under uncertainty. It forces the
individual to balance the value of gathering more information about the quality of potential choice
alternatives against the risk that competitors will act first and claim the best options. Although
this tradeoff between competition and exploration has long been recognized, little is known about
how people adapt their exploration of uncertain options when facing competitive pressure. We
examined how competitive pressure affects exploration in the rivals-in-the-dark game. Two
players simultaneously learn about a set of choice options and compete to claim the best one.
Across three studies, we show that people adapt their exploration in response to the structure of
the choice environment (including the option set size and the relative number of gains and losses)
and in response to repeated competition with the same opponent. Furthermore, we present a
model-based analysis showing that their behavior is best described by a compensatory strategy
under which the value of further exploration is weighed against the cost of being beaten to the
punch by an opponent. The results point to a process of local adaptation whereby people learn to
“act fast” based on their experience in a novel competitive environment.
Keywords: decisions from experience, competition, uncertainty, exploration
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To act fast or to bide time? Adaptive exploration under competitive pressure
People regularly compete for resources despite being uncertain about their true value.1
Competitive pressure affects a wide range of decisions under uncertainty, including selecting2
promising investment opportunities, hiring attractive job candidates, and purchasing a home in a3
desirable neighborhood. In each of these examples, the individual is initially uncertain about the4
relative values of available options. When left alone, she may prefer to bide her time, continuing5
to gather information about each option, until she feels ready to make a final choice between6
them. Competition, however, rarely affords the luxury of such well-informed decisions. Biding7
time carries the risk that competitors will act first and claim the best options for themselves.8
People must therefore balance the value of reducing uncertainty about options against the9
potential cost of losing out to others in the meantime.10
Take, for instance, the goal of reserving a hotel room for a weekend trip. Prospective11
vacationers have many opportunities to learn about the quality of potential choices. For each12
option, they could read about amenities on a hotel’s website, look at pictures of rooms or the13
surrounding neighborhood, read reviews from previous customers, and so on. The extent to which14
people engage in such exploration, however, likely depends on whether other people are15
competing for the same resource. Should the trip fall during a holiday season when many other16
people are searching with the same goal in mind, too much time spent exploring could mean that17
the best options are already gone by the time a decision is reached. The power of such18
competitive pressure to shape decisions is seen in marketing that highlights demand for limited19
resources (e.g., encouraging consumers to “act fast” as supplies are “flying off the shelves”).20
Research in economics and organizational behavior has long recognized that the benefits of21
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acquiring more information or experience can be counteracted by the costs of22
competition (Dickson, 1992; Stigler, 1961). Making fast decisions can be especially crucial for23
firms competing in uncertain or volatile environments (Eisenhardt, 1989). At the level of the24
individual, it is less clear how competitive pressure affects exploration during decision making.25
There is, however, strong evidence that people adapt how much they explore based on other26
cost-benefit tradeoffs unrelated to competition (Ratchford, 1982). People collect less information27
when such exploration involves costs, including monetary penalties (Busemeyer & Rapoport,28
1988; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970), opportunity costs (Payne, Bettman, & Luce, 1996; Rieskamp29
& Hoffrage, 2008), or high degrees of effort (Fu & Gray, 2006). Conversely, people explore more30
when larger rewards are at stake (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008), when they experience31
greater variability in outcomes (Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012), or when the set of32
available options is larger (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015; Hills, Noguchi, & Gibbert, 2013).33
Does this adaptive exploration hold under the threat of competition? Or does competitive34
pressure always cause people to “act fast,” regardless of their uncertainty about the options they35
choose? In the present article we investigate whether people weigh the costs of losing out to36
competitors against the situation-specific benefits of gaining more experience. Such a37
compensatory cost-benefit analysis is central to the expected-utility framework assumed by game38
theory (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). As a decision making39
strategy, it would predict that people weigh many factors when deciding how to explore, including40
how much they stand to learn from searching further and what might happen if someone else acts41
first. On the other hand, competition may evoke non-compensatory strategies that are42
well-adapted to social contexts even though they ignore some features of the43
environment (Bröder, 2000; Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2013; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). For44
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instance, striving to always act before anyone else may be a fruitful strategy in a competitive45
world, even if it involves sometimes betting on options that turn out to be poor. Distinguishing46
these decision making strategies is important to understanding how people compete in uncertain47
environments, as well as the factors that push them toward fast action.48
Rivals in the Dark: Balancing Exploration and Exploitation under Competitive Pressure49
We examined how people adapt their exploration in response to competitive pressure using50
a variant of the rivals-in-the-dark game introduced by Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, and Avrahami51
(2014). The game embeds the sampling paradigm, a tool for studying solitary, experienced-based52
choices (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004), into a strategic context. In the rivals-in-the-dark53
game, two players compete for the same set of choice options. Each option is a gamble that54
probabilistically generates a set of different outcomes (i.e., numerical values), and players can55
learn about options through repeated, non-consequential sampling (see Figure 1A). Players are56
instructed to sample until they are ready to choose one of the options for a monetary reward based57
on the chosen option’s expected value (EV). The game therefore separates an initial phase of58
exploration from a final exploitative choice.59
Previous studies of solitary behavior in the sampling paradigm have typically observed60
median sample sizes of about 16 total draws for problems with two options (for a review,61
see Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, & Hertwig, 2018). In comparison, players in the62
rivals-in-the-dark game drastically curtailed their exploration in the face of competitive63
pressure (Phillips et al., 2014), most often making only a single draw (the minimum sample size64
permitted) before making a choice.65
How does competition bring about this dramatic shift in behavior? The minimal exploration66
ADAPTIVE EXPLORATION UNDER COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 7
reported by Phillips et al. (2014) may indicate a non-compensatory response to competitive67
pressure: betting on the value of choosing first while ignoring the downsides of choosing based68
on little information. Such a strategy may be an effective response in the absence of knowledge69
about how opponents will behave. That is, even very small samples can provide an (modestly)70
informative cue to the overall value of an option (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010), as was the case in the71
choice environments of Phillips et al. and the present studies. Players can gain an edge—however72
slight—over their opponent by prioritizing fast decisions at the expense of reducing uncertainty.73
Accordingly, participants in Phillips et al. (2014) who made the first choice were more likely to74
obtain the option with the higher EV than their opponents, even though they frequently chose on75
the basis of just a single observation. In analogy to other examples of fast-and-frugal decision76
strategies that curtail information search by exploiting environmental structure (Gigerenzer,77
Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012), acting on minimal information may be78
advantageous in competitive settings even when uncertainty about options’ quality is high.79
Minimal exploration does not, however, uniquely identify a non-compensatory reaction to80
competition. A compensatory, cost-benefit account would suggest that minimal exploration stems81
from how participants weighed the perceived competitive pressure against the benefits of82
additional experience in the environment in question. In real-world domains, the intensity of83
competitive pressure can vary considerably as a function of resource type, social structures (e.g.,84
dominance hierarchies), or even time (e.g., seasonal demand). Although prioritizing fast decisions85
increases the chance of choosing before competitors, such a strategy may forego rewards when86
competitive pressure is actually low (e.g., when there are few competitors relative to the number87
of available options; see Phillips et al., 2014) or when small samples are misleading indicators of88
options’ long-term values. Similarly, the value of exploration is context-sensitive in that it is89
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informed by previous experiences, such as extremely negative outcomes that suggest an option is90
not worth exploring further. In light of these variations in environmental structure (e.g., highly91
skewed vs. normally distributed outcomes), individual experiences, and degrees of competitive92
pressure, people may benefit from conditioning their exploration on the local properties of the93
choice environment. If so, one should expect that people go beyond a one-size-fits-all response to94
competitive pressure by adapting how much they explore in light of these circumstances.95
Our goal was to examine this process of local adaptation when exploring under competitive96
pressure. Our studies were designed to address three key questions. First, we investigated whether97
exploration was affected by the structure of the competitive environment, including the degree of98
competitive pressure (i.e., the ratio of available options to number of competitors) and the99
distribution of options’ values (i.e., the relative number of gains and losses with positive and100
negative EVs, respectively). Second, we examined how the kind of feedback received by players101
influenced their willingness to explore. In particular, we tested how exploration changed when102
players only received social feedback (i.e., information about which player was the first to103
choose) or a combination of social and payoff feedback (i.e., the payoff from the option obtained104
at the end of each game). Third, we examined whether exploration changed across repeated105
interactions with the same competitor. Across multiple studies, we find that individuals under the106
threat of competition consistently draw small samples and commit to choices despite high107
uncertainty about options’ quality, indicating that the results of Phillips et al. (2014) generalize to108
a novel choice environment. However, we also find that exploration is influenced by several109
properties of the competitive environment and that it changes over the course of repeated play,110
suggesting that people use a process of local adaptation whereby they learn to act fast in response111
to experiencing competition.112
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The organization of the article is as follows. We first describe a novel choice environment113
that was the basis for our task and establish the relationship between exploration and expected114
performance (i.e., the ability to choose the option with the highest EV). We then describe three115
studies testing how people adapt their exploration under different competitive conditions. Finally,116
we present a model-based analysis aimed at understanding how participants make117
round-by-round decisions in the rivals-in-the-dark game. The model results provide further118
insight into our empirical findings by testing whether participants weigh the costs of competition119
against the benefits of further exploration in a context-sensitive, compensatory manner.120
Choice Environment121
The value of exploring an option through repeated sampling depends on the structure of a122
given choice environment, including the distribution of potential outcomes and their respective123
probabilities. At one extreme, if the first draw from an option is a perfectly valid cue of its value124
(e.g., as with a “sure thing” that always generates the same outcome), nothing is gained from125
sampling it more than once. In contrast, research involving the sampling paradigm often employs126
options with relatively consequential rare events, that is, infrequent outcomes that are unlikely to127
occur in small samples but have a large impact on an option’s overall quality. In these128
environments, small samples are likely to be insufficient to accurately assess an option’s EV.129
How do extreme rare events influence exploration? Existing theories of exploratory choice130
point to two kinds of potential mechanisms (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007; Wilson, Geana, White,131
Ludvig, & Cohen, 2014). The first view is that exploration functions much like exploitative132
choice in that attractive options are explored more frequently than unattractive options (Gonzalez133
& Dutt, 2011; Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2016). Rare outcomes have no influence on exploration until134
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they are experienced and change the perceived value of an option. The second view is that135
exploration is driven by beliefs about the environment, and in particular, predictions about how136
much information will be gained from different exploratory actions (Markant, Settles, &137
Gureckis, 2016; Nelson, 2005). The role of this latter belief-driven process in previous studies of138
the sampling paradigm is unclear. Participants are typically not informed about how options are139
generated, including the potential for extreme rare events (although some participants may140
discern this structure across multiple problems and subsequently prolong search in order to141
discover unexperienced rare outcomes, see Mehlhorn, Ben-Asher, Dutt, & Gonzalez, 2014).142
We aimed to test whether people trade off the costs of competition against the predicted143
benefits of exploration. To that end, we designed a choice environment in which the value of144
learning about rare outcomes through repeated sampling was transparent. In our variant of the145
rivals-in-the-dark game participants were informed about the probabilities and possible ranges of146
outcomes. Each option was associated with two outcomes: a common outcome that occurred with147
probability p = .8 and a rare outcome that occurred with probability 1− p = .2. The common148
outcome was a single number randomly sampled from a uniform distribution of discrete values in149
the range [-20, 20], whereas the rare outcome was sampled from a uniform distribution of discrete150
values in the range [-200, 200] (see Figure 1B for an illustrative problem).151
The option environment was thus characterized by potentially high-magnitude but152
infrequent outcomes that could have a large impact on the quality of an option. Given a choice153
between two options H and L with higher and lower EVs, respectively, players’ chances of154
choosing the H option increased substantially if they sampled enough to experience the rare155
outcome for at least one of the two options. To illustrate the value of experiencing a rare outcome156
in this environment, we generated a set of 10,000 two-option problems and assessed how157
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experiencing different subsets of outcomes for options H and L affected the probability of158
choosing the option with higher EV, p(H) (see Appendix A for details). For a given problem and159
set of observations, the predicted choice was derived from a Bayesian ideal observer that chooses160
the option with the higher predicted EV based on observed outcomes. The resulting p(H) is161
shown for all subsets of experienced outcomes in Table 1. When no rare outcome values are162
experienced, the proportion of H choices based on observing a single common outcome is .59,163
and increases slightly to .62 when common outcomes from both options are experienced. In164
contrast, p(H) is .81 when only a single rare outcome is observed and increases further as165
common outcomes are experienced for both options. Finally, observing the rare outcomes from166
both options leads to p(H) approaching 1, even when neither common outcome has been167
experienced. Thus, although experiencing one or both common outcomes across the two options168
results in better-than-chance selection of H, players’ ability to choose H rises substantially if they169
sample long enough to observe at least one rare outcome.170
We next examined how choice performance depends on the amount of exploration in terms171
of total sample size. The probability of observing at least one rare outcome is described by the172
cumulative geometric distribution in Figure 1C (solid line). The expected probability of selecting173
H was found by simulating sets of observations of a given sample size and using the same choice174
procedure as above (Appendix A). The resulting mean p(H) for the ideal observer is indicated by175
the dashed line in Figure 1C. Note that 16 draws, the median sample size observed in previous176
studies of the sampling paradigm, is associated with near perfect accuracy (99% chance of177
choosing H) in our choice environment under this model. As such, highly accurate choices could178
be made with a modest amount of exploration, provided, however, that the individual experienced179
one or more of the rare outcomes.180
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Study 1: Distinguishing the Threat of Competition from Opportunity Costs181
Our first goal was to evaluate the effects of competitive pressure in the choice environment182
described above. Relative to behavior in solitary implementations of the sampling paradigm183
(e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004), we anticipated that sample sizes would be smaller due to participants’184
explicit knowledge about the environment, which in most problems obviates the need to estimate185
outcomes’ relative frequency through repeated sampling.1 At the same time, we predicted that186
sample sizes may be larger than seen by Phillips et al. (2014) because the outcome distributions in187
the present environment are more skewed (i.e., higher variances in outcomes; see Lejarraga et al.,188
2012) and participants were explicitly informed about this potential for high-magnitude rare189
outcomes.2190
The second goal was to examine whether reduced search under competitive pressure is due191
to increased opportunity costs imposed by the synchronous nature of the rivals-in-the-dark game.192
In solitary settings people adjust how much they search based on the costs involved in obtaining193
information, whether in the form of high degrees of effort (Gray & Fu, 2004), monetary194
penalties (Busemeyer & Rapoport, 1988; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970), or opportunity costs (Payne195
1In most problems the rare outcome falls outside the range of common outcomes ([−20,20]), and can therefore be
identified as occurring with p = .2 after a single observation. However, for some problems the rare outcome happens
to fall within the same range as the common outcome. In those cases, repeated sampling would still be necessary to
estimate the relative frequency of the two outcomes.
2In Phillips et al. (2014) each option was associated with a positive outcome and a negative outcome. Across the
full set of gambles, these outcomes fell within smaller ranges than in our environment (positive: [25, 55], negative:
[-26, -11]) whereas the probability of the positive outcome ranged from .22 to .5 (M = .35). As a result, lower-
probability outcomes tended to be both less extreme and more likely to occur in small samples as compared to the
present environment.
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et al., 1996; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). Competitors in the rivals-in-the-dark game are subject196
to delays from waiting for opponents to make decisions. These delays represent additional197
opportunity costs that may decrease search effort but are not specific to the competitive nature of198
the interaction. To test this alternative explanation, we compared a Competitive condition to an199
Independent condition. In the former, players’ choices were dependent on the actions of their200
opponents; in the latter, participants observed the final choices of a partner but were free to search201
and choose options independently. Opportunity costs and social feedback (cues indicating202
partners’ choices) were matched across conditions, allowing us to isolate the effect of competitive203
pressure on search effort and final choices.204
Finally, we employed a repeated-play design to explore the dynamics of competitive search205
across multiple games with the same opponent. Will competitors adopt an unbending sampling206
strategy from the outset of the experiment, that is, prioritizing fast decisions by always stopping207
after a single observation? Or, will they adapt their search effort in response to competition, for208
instance, after they experience an opponent choosing first? Given the consequential nature of209
social feedback experienced during competitive play, we expected that changes in sample size210
would not be observed when the same feedback did not constrain participants’ decisions211
(Independent condition).212
Participants and Materials213
We recruited 212 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com)214
using the psiTurk software package (http://www.psiturk.org; Gureckis et al., 2015). Forty-four215
participants (20%) failed to complete the game because a member of their group left early,216
leaving a total of 168 complete experimental runs (61 female, 54 male, 1 other, 52 no response;217
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Mage = 35.6, SD = 11.5, 52 no response). Participants received a base payment of $0.50 for their218
participation as well as a bonus of up to $3 depending on their performance. Participants were219
randomly assigned to either the Independent condition or Competitive condition (both N = 84 or220
42 pairs in each condition).221
We randomly generated 20 problem sets comprised of 8 problems each using the choice222
environment described above. Option sets were resampled if the difference between the EV for223
the H and L options was less than 25 points. In addition, option sets were resampled if the224
summed EV across all L options was less than −100 or the summed EV of all H options was225
greater than 200, ensuring that each participant’s total number of points at the end of the226
experiment would lie within that range.227
Procedure228
Practice. Participants were informed about the probabilities and ranges of the common229
and rare outcomes, and were instructed that the goal of the game was to claim the option with the230
higher average outcome value. Prior to playing, they completed four trials of non-consequential,231
solitary sampling with individual options. In each trial, a single option appeared and participants232
were instructed to sample 25 times and observe the resulting outcomes. They were then asked to233
report the two outcomes observed during sampling and to estimate the average value of the234
observed outcomes. All participants experienced the same four practice options, including235
options where both outcomes came from the same domain (e.g., both the common and rare236
outcomes were positive) and options where they came from different domains (e.g., a common237
negative outcome but rare positive outcome with high value). This practice ensured that238
participants were familiar with the structure of individual options, including the relative frequency239
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and range of each outcome type, as well as the EV criterion we encouraged them to maximize.240
Group formation and coordination. Upon completion of the practice trials, participants241
were presented with a list of open groups and instructed to join one group. After joining an open242
group, they waited for another person to join, at which point both confirmed that they were ready243
to play. If a participant waited for more than 15 minutes without a second person joining their244
group, the experiment aborted and they were paid for partial participation. Gameplay was245
coordinated such that the game advanced only when decisions were received from each246
participant and broadcast to the other. This helped to ensure that both participants were present247
and attentive throughout the experiment. For example, participants continued to the next sampling248
round only when they acknowledged their opponent’s decision to either stop or continue249
sampling. If either participant closed the experiment or was idle for more than 4 minutes at any250
point after joining a group, the experiment ended and both participants were paid for partial251
participation. Only data from the 84 pairs that completed the full set of eight games are analyzed.252
Gameplay. Participants began with an endowment of $1.00 and were instructed that their253
payoff from each game (the EV of the option they selected) would be added or subtracted to254
determine their final bonus, with each point corresponding to $.01. One of the twenty problem255
sets was randomly selected for each pair of participants and the eight games were played in a256
random order. On each round of the game, a participant clicked on one of the two options257
(displayed as two urns filled with coins) and observed a randomly generated outcome (a coin258
labeled with a number of points between −200 and 200, randomly sampled according to the259
underlying distribution for that option). The outcome remained visible until the participant260
indicated whether they wanted to “continue learning” or “stop and choose” by clicking one of two261
buttons at the bottom of the display (see Figure 1A). If both participants decided to continue262
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sampling the game proceeded to the next round. When participants decided to stop and choose an263
option, they then clicked on one of the two options to claim it (subject to the condition-specific264
procedures below). No feedback about the payoff from the chosen option was provided during the265
games. At the end of the game play, participants were shown the true value of the options they266
chose and their total bonus.267
Independent condition. In the Independent condition, participants’ final choices were268
made known to their partners, but a partner’s choice had no other consequences on the269
participant’s ability to sample or choose options. When participants decided to stop, their270
selections were visible to their partners in the form of an icon that appeared below the chosen271
option. However, partners were able to continue sampling for as many turns as they desired, and272
when they stopped could select either of the two options. Both participants in a pair were still273
required to acknowledge the completion of every round, ensuring that the participant who stopped274
first continued to pay attention to her partner’s behavior for the remainder of the game and that275
the opportunity costs were matched with those of the Competitive condition.276
Competitive condition. In the competitive condition, a participant’s decision to stop and277
choose an option removed it from the set of options available to his or her opponent. When such a278
choice occurred, the option faded out on the display and the opponent was required to279
immediately select the remaining option. If both participants decided to stop on the same round, a280
random choice order was generated to determine which participant went first. That participant281
was awarded the value of the chosen urn whereas the other participant was awarded the value of282
the remaining urn. All other aspects of the game were the same as in the Independent condition.283
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Results284
Exploration. Mean sample size across eight games is shown in Figure 2A. We used285
mixed effects negative binomial regression to evaluate the effects of condition (Independent vs.286
Competitive) and trial number (games 1–8) on sample size (using the lme4 R package), with a287
random effect to model variability across pairs. Table 2 reports the parameter estimates,288
confidence intervals, and inferential statistics for the resulting model (with the Independent group289
as the reference condition). Each estimated fixed effect indicates the change in log sample size290
associated with a unit change in the predictor. There was an effect of condition indicating smaller291
sample sizes in the Competitive condition (M = 2.1, SD = 1.8) compared to the Independent292
condition (M = 5.1, SD = 4.7). In addition, there was a positive effect of trial number on sample293
size, indicating an increase in sample size over games in the baseline Independent condition.294
Finally, there was an interaction between the Competitive condition and trial number. A post-hoc295
contrast indicated, in contrast to the Independent condition, there was an overall decrease in296
sample size over games in the Competitive condition (β=−.11 [−.17,−.06], p < .001).297
The decrease in sample size over games within the Competitive condition was evident at the298
level of individual pairs, with 27 pairs (64%) showing a decrease in mean sample size from the299
first half to second half of the game rounds. Of the remaining pairs, 6 (14%) showed no change,300
and 9 (21%) showed an increase in mean sample size. In contrast, pairs in the Independent301
condition showed the opposite pattern of change from the first to second half, with 15 pairs (36%)302
showing a decrease, 1 (2%) showing no change, and 26 (62%) showing an increase in sample size.303
The difference in sample size between conditions affected the likelihood of experiencing304
rare outcomes, as anticipated by our description of the choice environment. In the Independent305
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condition, participants did not observe either rare outcome in 40% of all games, whereas306
participants in the Competitive condition (combined across all participants regardless of whether307
they decided to stop or not) did not observe either rare outcome in 65% of all games (χ2 = 84.3,308
p < .001). Note that it was not the case that competitors who decided to stop were simply more309
likely to have observed a rare outcome. Focusing on those games in which one participant310
stopped before the other (non-ties), in 55% of them the first stopper (i.e., the participant from311
each pair who was the first to terminate sampling) did not experience a rare outcome. Among tied312
games, at least one participant had not observed a rare outcome in 81% of games. Combining313
these cases leads to 63% of games in which at least one participant in a group decided to stop314
before observing a rare outcome.315
Notably, although sample size was higher in the Independent condition on the first game,316
the mean sample size among first stoppers (players that were the first of a pair to stop exploring)317
in that condition was similar to that of the Competitive condition (see dashed line in Figure 2).318
Negative binomial regression was used to test the effect of condition on sample size in the first319
game, focusing only on the sample size of the first stoppers in each group. There was no effect of320
condition (β= .03, z = .17, p = .86). This result suggests that participants in both conditions may321
have began with similar strategies, but differentially adjusted their exploration across trials due to322
the presence or absence of competition.323
Was the decline in exploration in the Competitive condition a response to losing out to324
opponents? We used mixed effects logistic regression to model whether sample size decreased325
between successive trials (binarized). The main factor of interest was whether first choosers on326
trial t were “slower” than their opponent on trial t−1 (Slowert−1), that is, whether they had been327
the second chooser in the previous trial. In addition, trial number (2−8) and the Trial ×328
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Slowert−1 interaction were included as predictors, since decreases between successive trials were329
less frequent in later trials. The results are shown in Table 3. Effect sizes are reported in terms of330
relative odds ratios (OR). As compared to cases in which the chooser was the same across trials,331
being beaten by the opponent on the previous trial was associated with a higher likelihood that332
sample sizes decreased. This effect was largest on the second trial: being beaten on the first trial333
was associated with an increase of a factor of OR = 3.36 [1.38,8.58] in the relative odds of334
sample size decreasing on the second round. This is strong evidence that being out-chosen is a335
critical factor in reducing search in competitive environments.336
Final choices. We next evaluated whether the two conditions differed in their selection of337
the H option. Figure 2B shows the proportion of H (rank=1) and L (rank=2) choices among first338
and second choosers across all games, for games in which neither rare outcome was experienced,339
and for games in which at least one rare outcome was experienced. In the Independent condition,340
both first and second choosers were more likely than not to choose the H option and benefited341
from observing at least one rare outcome. In the Competitive condition, a similar advantage was342
only seen for first choosers.343
We used mixed effects logistic regression to model the effects of condition (Independent vs.344
Competitive), trial (1–8), and experiencing at least one rare outcome on the likelihood of345
choosing H (Table 3). For the Competitive condition, we included only those participants who346
made the first choice (either because they stopped before their opponent or it was a tie and they347
were randomly selected to choose first). There was no effect of trial number in the Independent348
condition. Although the overall effect of condition was not significant (Independent: M = .78,349
SD = .17; Competitive: M = .68, SD = .27), there was a condition × trial interaction such that350
first choosers in the Competitive condition were less likely to choose H over the course of the351
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experiment (OR = .84 [.74, .97]). Finally, as expected from our analysis of the choice352
environment (Figure 1), the likelihood of choosing H increased if the chooser experienced at least353
one rare outcome (OR = 2.91 [2.12,4.03]).354
Discussion355
Compared with the non-competitive social context of the Independent condition,356
competitive pressure reduced exploration, consistent with Phillips et al.’s (2014) observations.357
The higher search effort observed in the Independent condition suggests that small sample sizes in358
the Competition condition did not result from higher opportunity costs (e.g., delays due to waiting359
for an opponent to make decisions) or social information alone (i.e., notification of the other360
participant’s final choice), elements that were matched across conditions.361
Small sample sizes in the Competitive condition predictably led participants to fail to362
experience any rare outcomes before a majority of stopping decisions. This significantly lowered363
their ability to choose the H option (Figure 2B). Of course, this does not imply that competitors364
failed to understand the potential impact of rare outcomes or acted unreasonably by stopping365
before they had identified any rare outcomes. Given that knowledge of the common outcomes366
alone can lead to better than chance selection of the H option, participants may have prioritized367
fast decisions based on that partial knowledge rather than risk losing the ability to make the first368
choice.369
Finally, sample sizes changed over the course of repeated games in different directions for370
the two conditions. In the Competitive condition sample sizes declined, consistent with a dynamic371
process whereby competitors adjusted how much they sampled in response to experiencing372
competitive pressure. In contrast, there was a small increase in sample size in the Independent373
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condition, indicating that the decline seen in the Competitive condition was not simply due to374
experience with the game or choice environment. Interestingly, the distributions of sample sizes375
among first stoppers in the first game were not significantly different between the two conditions,376
suggesting that participants in both conditions began the game with similar strategies but then377
diverged in how they responded to social feedback about their partners’ choices.378
In sum, the results of the first experiment suggest that the response to competitive pressure379
changes as a result of direct experience with competition. In addition, they provide clear evidence380
that competitive pressure leads to restricted exploration despite high uncertainty about the quality381
of the available options. In contrast to the procedure of Phillips et al., (2014), participants knew382
there were rare outcomes to be discovered in every problem. Nevertheless, they frequently383
stopped exploring before learning about those outcomes. Does this reflect a non-compensatory384
strategy of acting before competitors at the expense of reducing uncertainty? In the next two385
studies we examine whether this response is invariant to manipulations of the situation-specific386
tradeoff between competitive pressure and exploration.387
Study 2: The Impact of Set Size and Payoff Feedback388
Two properties of the first study may have amplified the impact of competition on389
exploration. First, the high ratio of players to the number of options (2:2) likely contributed to a390
keen sense of competition for the best option, particularly since gains and losses were equally391
likely. In Study 2, we examined this further by manipulating the number of choice options (2392
vs. 4), with the prediction that competitors would be more willing to bide their time when more393
options were available, that is, when they face a “buyers’ market.” This prediction is supported by394
simulations conducted by Phillips et al. (2014, see their Figure 6) showing that players benefit395
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from planning to collect larger samples when there are more options than competitors.396
Second, participants in Experiment 1 did not receive immediate “on-line” feedback about397
the outcomes of their final choices (i.e., the payoffs applied to their bonus at the end of the game).398
Without this feedback, they could not evaluate the consequences of their choices with respect to399
their level of uncertainty (e.g., after claiming an option for which the rare outcome was400
unknown). At the same time, competitors did receive immediate on-line social feedback about401
whether they were able to choose first or were beaten to the punch by their opponents. In the402
absence of payoff feedback, social feedback may have encouraged participants to prioritize403
choosing first regardless of their uncertainty about the options. We tested this hypothesis in Study404
2 by manipulating the type of on-line feedback participants received over the course of the game.405
The No-feedback condition was identical to the Competitive condition in Experiment 1. In the406
Partial-feedback condition, participants learned on-line (after each choice) the payoff of the407
option they chose but did not see the payoffs of options chosen by their opponents. If feedback408
about their choices permits individuals to learn the value of exploring until rare outcomes are409
experienced, larger sample sizes would be expected relative to the No-feedback condition.410
Finally, in the Full-feedback condition, players were given feedback about the value of both411
options chosen by either player. Since full feedback allows participants to directly assess how412
their ability to choose the H option depends on whether they experienced rare outcomes, we413
anticipated that sample sizes in the Full-feedback condition would increase to an equal or greater414
extent than in the Partial-feedback condition.415
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Participants and Materials416
We recruited 618 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. One-hundred417
twenty-eight (21%) failed to complete the task because a member of their group left early or was418
idle for more than four minutes, leaving a total of 490 complete experimental runs (190 female,419
161 male, 1 other, 138 no response; Mage = 34.5, SD = 10.9, 137 no response). Participants420
received a base payment of $.50 for their participation, as well as a bonus of up to $3 depending421
on their performance. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions based on crossing the422
number of options and feedback condition (2-options, No-Feedback: N = 80; 2-options,423
Partial-feedback: N = 70; 2-options, Full-feedback: N = 86; 4-options, No-Feedback: N = 86;424
4-options, Partial-feedback: N = 78; 4-options, Full-feedback: N = 90).425
Procedure426
The option sets from Study 1 were used for the 2-option conditions. For the 4-option427
conditions, new option sets were generated with the same general procedure as detailed in Study428
1, with the additional constraint that each problem included two losses (one with an EV less than429
−20 and a second with an EV in the range [−20, −1]) and two gains (one with an EV greater430
than 20 and a second with an EV in the range [1, 20]). Participants were not informed about this431
distribution of option EVs. All other aspects of the instructions and practice trials were the same432
as in Study 1.433
All participants completed eight trials. Gameplay in the No-feedback conditions was434
identical to that of the Competitive condition in Experiment 1. In the Partial-feedback condition,435
participants observed the EV of the option they chose at the end of each game. In the436
Full-feedback condition, the EV of both chosen options was displayed to both players upon437
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completion of each game.438
Results439
Exploration. Mean sample size across eight trials is shown in Figure 3A for each440
condition. Negative binomial regression was used to evaluate the effects of feedback condition441
(No-, Partial-, and Full-feedback), number of options (2 vs. 4), and trial number (1–8) on sample442
size (Table 2). Sample size was higher in the 4-option groups (No-feedback: M = 2.79, SD = 2.2;443
Partial-feedback: M = 2.63, SD = 1.59; Full-feedback: M = 2.43, SD = 1.98) compared to the444
2-option groups (No-feedback: M = 1.67, SD = 0.94; Partial-feedback: M = 1.81, SD = 1.22;445
Full-feedback: M = 1.53, SD = 0.86), showing that participants explored more when a larger446
number of options were available. In addition, there was a negative effect of trial such that sample447
size declined over the course of the game. There was no effect of feedback condition or448
interaction between feedback condition and number of options. Across all 2-option games, the449
first chooser stopped before observing a rare outcome in 65% of games. In 4-option games, the450
first chooser stopped before experiencing a rare outcome in 49% of games (χ2 = 52.9, p < .001).451
Thus, although 4-option participants tended to sample longer than 2-option participants, they452
nevertheless frequently stopped to claim an option without experiencing any rare outcomes.453
Logistic regression was used to test whether being beaten by the opponent on the previous454
round was associated with decreases in sample size (Table 3). Decreases were less likely in later455
trials (OR = 0.87, [0.79,0.95]) and were more likely in the 4-option condition than the 2-option456
condition (OR = 1.77, [1.43,2.20]). As in Study 1, being beaten by the opponent on the previous457
trial increased the likelihood that sample sizes decreased. For instance, being the second chooser458
in trial one increased the odds of a lower sample size in trial two by factor of459
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OR = 2.27 [1.58,3.32].460
Final choices. The proportion of choices by rank (with 1 indicating the option with the461
highest value, H) is shown in Figure 3B for both the first chooser and second choosers, collapsed462
across feedback conditions. The probability of the first chooser selecting the H option was463
modeled using mixed effects logistic regression, with choices in the 2-option and 4-option464
conditions analyzed separately (Table 3). As in Study 1, observing at least one rare outcome465
increased the probability of choosing H among both 2-option (OR = 2.82, [2.07,3.89]) and466
4-option (OR = 2.14, [1.64,2.80]) participants. There were no effects of feedback condition, trial,467
or feedback × trial interaction on choice proportions in either condition.468
Discussion469
As in Study 1, sample sizes declined over games in both 2-option and 4-option games.470
Contrary to our predictions, we did not find any effect of choice feedback on exploration or the471
proportion of H choices. Whereas we expected that choice feedback about one or both options472
would encourage participants to explore until they experienced rare outcomes, sample sizes were473
equivalent across feedback conditions (and in fact, were smallest in the Full-feedback group).474
Thus, we found no evidence that providing choice feedback counteracts the downward pressure of475
competition on exploration.476
In contrast to the null effect of feedback, exploration was strongly affected by the number477
of choice options. In individual settings, sample size is roughly linearly related to the number of478
available options, with people exploring more as the option set size increases (Frey et al., 2015;479
Hills et al., 2013). Although sample sizes in the present study were small relative to those cases,480
we nonetheless found that competitors explored more when the size of the option set was481
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doubled. This finding agrees with the simulation results of Phillips et al. (2014) showing that482
players benefit from planning to collect larger samples when a larger number of options are483
available, given a fixed number of competitors.484
What explains the willingness of 4-option participants to explore longer than participants in485
2-option games? One possibility is that, as we suggested was the case in Study 1, participants486
began the game with the same strategy they might have employed as a solitary player. That is,487
participants in the 4-option conditions may have initially explored to a larger extent (consistent488
with the effect of option set size in solitary settings), but then decreased their search effort across489
trials as a result of experiencing competition.490
Alternatively, increased exploration in 4-option games may have reflected a lower degree of491
perceived competitive pressure in that environment. There are at least two ways that participants492
may have arrived at such a judgment. First, they might predict a low cost of choosing second in493
the 4-option case, since they can still select among the remaining options. Given the distribution494
of option EVs (two gains and two losses), even when their opponents chose the H option,495
participants still had a shot at selecting an option with a positive EV. Participants were not496
informed about this distribution, but may have reasonably assumed from the instructions and497
practice trials that gains and losses were equally likely. Second, 4-option participants may have498
predicted that it would take opponents a larger number of draws to discover an attractive option,499
whereas for 2-option problems even sampling a single option can be decisive as to which option500
should be claimed. Both explanations suggest that expectations about the distribution of option501
EVs influence how people evaluate the degree of competitive pressure. Next, we directly test this502
possibility by manipulating the ratio of gains and losses across different games in the final study.503
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Study 3: Competing for Few or Plentiful Gains504
How is exploration affected by knowledge of the distribution of option values? This study505
involved two within-subjects conditions that determined the ratio of options with positive EV506
(gains) and negative EV (losses) in each game: 1-gain/3-loss games and 3-gain/1-loss games. All507
participants played 4-option games under competition and were informed about the ratio of gains508
and losses within each game. We considered two competing predictions for how the gain-loss509
ratio could affect search. On the one hand, if a higher proportion of gains leads participants to510
believe that opponents will sample less (e.g., because it will take fewer samples to discover an511
attractive option), this increased competitive pressure should cause exploration in the 3-gain512
condition to be lower than that of the 1-gain condition. On the other hand, if participants judge513
the cost of “losing” to an opponent (i.e., choosing second) to be lower when most options are514
gains, this should decrease competitive pressure and cause exploration in the 3-gain condition to515
be higher than that of the 1-gain condition.516
Participants and Materials517
We recruited 152 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Thirty-two participants518
(21%) failed to complete the task because a member of their group left early or was idle for more519
than four minutes, leaving a total of 120 complete experimental runs (53 female, 34 male, 33 no520
response; Mage = 33.4, SD = 11.1, 33 no response). Participants were paid a base payment of521
$1.00 for complete participation ($0.50 for partial participation) and a bonus of up to $3522
depending on their performance.523
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Procedure524
All participants were assigned to competitive play in games with four options and no525
on-line payoff feedback. Participants were instructed that the value of each option could either be526
positive (a gain) or negative (a loss) and that games would vary in the ratio of the two types.527
During each game, the number of options from each domain was described above the displayed528
options (either “1 gain, 3 losses” or “3 gains, 1 loss”). Each pair experienced four games in each529
condition presented in random order.530
Twenty new problem sets were generated with 8 problems per set. Each set contained 4531
problems with 1 gain and 4 problems with 3 gains (otherwise losses). Problem sets were532
resampled if the summed value of all options with the lowest values fell outside the range [−250,533
−150] or the summed value of all best options fell outside the range [150, 250]. This constrained534
the range of final bonuses while ensuring that all option sets featured a wide range of outcome535
values. Each pair of participants was randomly assigned one of the twenty problem sets.536
Results and Discussion537
Exploration. Across all 1-gain games, the first chooser stopped before observing a rare538
outcome in 55% of games, whereas in 3-gain games the first chooser stopped before any rare539
outcome in 61% of games, a non-significant difference (χ2 = 2.47, p = .12). The results of mixed540
effects negative binomial regression on sample size (Table 2) indicated a significant negative541
effect of number of gains, with sample size lower in 3-gain games (M = 2.28, SD = 1.64) as542
compared to 1-gain games (M = 2.74, SD = 2.24). Thus, competitors searched more in543
environments with a high proportion of negative options compared to those with a low proportion.544
Unlike the previous studies, there was no effect of trial number on sample size (Table 2),545
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indicating there was no evidence that exploration changed over the course of the experiment. In546
addition, losing out to opponents had no effect on the likelihood of sample size decreasing in the547
following trial (Table 3).548
Final choices. The proportion of choices by option rank are shown in Figure 4 for both549
the 1st and 2nd chooser in each condition. As in the previous studies, mixed effects logistic550
regression (Table 4) revealed that the probability of obtaining the H option increased when a rare551
outcome had been observed (OR = 2.63 [1.80,3.88]). In addition, there was an effect of condition552
such that a smaller proportion of H choices were made in 3-gain games (OR = .65 [.43, .95]),553
consistent with the lower sample sizes in that condition.554
In sum, competitors’ exploration was affected by the ratio of gains and losses, with an555
increase in sample size when faced with a single gain among four options as compared to a single556
loss. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that participants perceived lower competitive557
pressure in the 1-gain condition. That is, they behaved as if they expected that opponents would558
have to search more to find an attractive option. However, it cannot be ruled out that the559
difference in sample sizes was caused by a simpler, non-compensatory strategy that does not560
involve reasoning about or predicting competitors’ behavior. In solitary conditions people explore561
more when they experience negative outcomes (Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2016; Lejarraga et al.,562
2012). Phillips et al. (2014) also observed that competitors were more likely to sample more than563
once when the first outcome they experienced was negative. Accordingly, participants in Study 3564
may have simply been more likely to continue sampling in 1-gain games because negative565
outcomes were encountered more frequently. Distinguishing between these explanations requires566
a closer examination of participants’ decisions in the context of the outcomes they experienced.567
We turn to this in the following model-based analysis.568
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Modeling Adaptive Exploration under Competition569
Our results across three studies show that people adapt how they explore based on the local570
properties of a competitive environment, such as sampling more when more options are present or571
when losses are more common than gains. Exploration also changes in response to competitive572
experience, with sample sizes decreasing across repeated games against the same opponent. In573
this section we return to a central question regarding how people decide when to stop exploring,574
namely, whether they weigh the costs of competition against the value of exploration on a575
round-by-round basis.576
Predicting how an opponent will act is key to determining how much to explore. Phillips et577
al. (2014) demonstrated through simulation that players in a choice environment similar to ours578
will tend to benefit from choosing first, even when relying on a single outcome. The simulation579
assumed that players begin the game by deciding on a desired sample size. If players knew their580
opponents would sample N times, they should sample one fewer times (N−1) in order to learn as581
much as possible about the options while preserving the ability to choose first. If they don’t know582
how much opponents will search, however, players should err on the side of sampling too little583
rather than too much. High uncertainty about how long an opponent plans to sample tends to584
favor extremely limited exploration, particularly when the number of options is low relative to the585
number of players (Phillips et al., 2014, see pg. 115).586
One limitation of the previous approach is that it does not account for the round-by-round587
nature of players’ decisions in the task. Importantly, the value of exploring depends on both the588
likely actions of competitors and the outcomes that have been observed so far. For instance, in the589
present choice environment, if both the frequent and rare outcomes of an option have been seen590
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(e.g., observing −100 and 10 from the same option), there is no uncertainty and nothing more to591
learn from sampling that option further. Even if there is uncertainty about an option’s value,592
however, the benefits of reducing it may be moot if the opponent is likely to stop on the current593
round.594
We conducted a model-based analysis to test whether participants’ round-by-round595
decisions were driven by this tradeoff between competitive pressure and the value of exploration.596
We considered three decision models. All three models rely on Bayesian updating to represent597
uncertainty about available options and to predict the value of both immediates choices and598
further exploration. They differ in how these predictions drive decisions to stop and choose or to599
continue exploring. We briefly introduce each model here before describing the analysis in detail600
below.601
• The Constant model simply assumes that players stop exploring with a constant probability602
following each draw, implying that decisions to stop are independent of the outcomes that603
are experienced. If, for example, players adopt a non-compensatory strategy in which they604
stop after a single draw regardless of its value, their behavior would be captured by the605
Constant model with a high stopping probability.606
• The Choice-first model assumes that people decide whether to stop and choose based on607
options’ predicted values, such that an option with a high predicted value is likely to be608
chosen immediately; otherwise sampling continues. This strategy echoes Phillips et al.’s609
observation that many participants stopped immediately when the first outcome they610
observed was positive (suggesting an attractive option), but continued exploring further611
when it was negative. It is also consistent with findings of larger sample sizes when612
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negative outcomes are experienced in solitary implementations of the sampling613
paradigm (Lejarraga et al., 2012).614
• Finally, the Tradeoff model assumes that players weigh the value of an immediate choice615
against the value of making an additional draw, explicitly accounting for the probability that616
the opponent will stop and claim an option first. Unlike the Constant and Choice-first617
models in which exploration is contingent on a previous decision to not stop and choose an618
option, under the Tradeoff strategy the player simultaneously compares the expected payoff619
of an immediate choice against that of exploring further given the costs imposed by620
competition. In solitary sequential decision making with fixed costs of collecting621
information, Busemeyer and Rapoport (1988) found that stopping behavior was best622
described by a similar myopic strategy, in which the expected payoff of an immediate623
exploitative choice is compared to that expected after one more round of exploration.3 It is624
an open question, however, whether people rely on a similar strategy when the costs of625
exploration arise from competition.626
Belief Updating627
The decision models use Bayesian updating to represent uncertainty about the set of628
available options, O = {A,B, ...}, given the outcomes observed so far, X . The goal is to identify629
the state of option k, sk ∈ S, where each state is a unique combination of a rare and frequent630
outcome from their respective ranges, zscommon ∈ {Zcommon :−20 . . .20} and631
zsrare ∈ {Zrare :−200 . . .200}. The hypothesis space S comprising possible option states is632
3This strategy is considered “myopic” because it only evaluates what will happen one step into the future, whereas
an optimal solution would consider action sequences of any length.
ADAPTIVE EXPLORATION UNDER COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 33
therefore the cartesian product Zcommon×Zrare. Each option state is associated with a reward633
equal to the expected value, µ(s) = 0.8 · zscommon+0.2 · zsrare.634




.8, if z = zscommon 6= zsrare,
.2, if z = zsrare 6= zscommon,





Given the subset of outcomes observed from sampling option k, Xk = {z1,z2, . . .}, the posterior637
probability of each option state is determined using Bayes rule,638
p(s|Xk) = p(Xk|s)p(s)∑s′∈S p(Xk|s′)p(s′)
, (2)
where p(Xk|s) =∏z∈Xk p(z|s) and p(s) is the prior probability. We assume a flat initial prior over639
the hypothesis space for each option (p(s) = 1/|S|) and that options are independent. Note that640
this assumption of independence is not applicable to Experiment 3, in which the distribution of641
options’ states in a given problem depended on the condition (e.g., 1 gain/3 losses). The642
corresponding Bayesian model for Experiment 3 is described in Appendix B.643
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Note that when options are independent, the predicted value of an option that has not yet been646
sampled is R(k,{}) = 0. Equation 3 thus defines the expected reward from claiming option k647
given the outcomes observed so far. Finally, the probability of observing a new outcome648
z ∈ {−200 . .200} if option k is sampled is given by the marginal probability,649
p(z|k,X) =∑
s∈S
p(z|s) · p(s|Xk). (4)
Decision Models650
Model 1: Constant stopping probability. The Constant model assumes that people stop651
exploring according to a constant probability, q. If the player stops, the predicted value of652
choosing option k is equal to the predicted reward (Equation 3) given the outcomes observed so653
far (X),654
Vchoose(k,X) = R(k,X). (5)
Final choices are modeled with a softmax function, such that the probability of stopping and655
choosing option k is656
p(choose k) = q · exp(Vchoose(k,X) ·φ)
∑ j∈O exp(Vchoose( j,X) ·φ)
. (6)
The parameter φ controls the individual’s sensitivity to predicted value. When φ= 0, options are657
chosen randomly. As φ increases, decisions become increasingly deterministic with respect to the658
predicted value.659
If the player decides not to stop they must select an option to explore. The Bayesian model660
is used to evaluate the benefit of exploring each option in terms of the predicted value of choosing661
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after an additional outcome is observed (referred to as a preposterior analysis, see Berger, 1985).662
The value of sampling option k is defined as the expected maximum option value after having663





Vchoose( j,X ∪ z)]. (7)
The probability of sampling option k is again modeled using a softmax function with the same665
sensitivity parameter φ, now multiplied by the probability that the player chose to not stop:666
p(sample k) = (1−q) · exp(Vsample(k,X) ·φ)
∑ j∈O exp(Vsample( j,X) ·φ)
. (8)
Thus, under the Constant model stopping decisions are based solely on the value of q and667
are therefore independent of experienced outcomes. The player then proceeds to select an option668
based on its predicted value, both for final choices and exploration. The parameters q and φ are669
assumed to be fixed during a game. Note, however, that a player relying on this strategy might670
respond to competitive pressure by adjusting the probability of stopping across games (e.g.,671
increasing q after losing out to an opponent).672
Model 2: Choice-first. Like the Constant model, the Choice-first model assumes that the673
player first decides whether to stop and choose an option. However, the probability of stopping674
depends on the current predicted value of the options. If an option is attractive based on675
previously observed outcomes, the player is more likely to stop and claim it on the current round676
rather than continue exploring.677
The value of choosing and sampling decisions are given by Equations 5 and 7. The678
probability of choosing option k is679
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p(choose k) =
exp(Vchoose(k,X) ·φ+ c)
1+∑ j∈O exp(Vchoose( j,X) ·φ+ c)
, (9)
where φ is the sensitivity parameter and c is a bias parameter. High values of c correspond to a680
bias toward stopping even when Vchoose(k,X) is low. This choice rule is equivalent to a681
multinomial logit model with the “continue sampling” action as the baseline category (Agresti,682
1996).683
If the player decides to continue exploring, the choice of which option to sample next is684
modeled in the same way as in the Constant model. Given that the probability that a player685
continues sampling is [1−∑ j∈O p(choose j)], the probability of sampling option k is686
p(sample k) = [1− ∑
j∈O
p(choose j)] · exp(Vsample(k,X) ·φ)
∑ j∈O exp(Vsample( j,X) ·φ)
. (10)
The Choice-first model therefore assumes that players are likely to stop and choose options687
that have a high predicted value; in the absence of such options they continue to explore. As in688
the Constant model, sampling decisions are based on the predicted value of observing another689
outcome from a given option. Across multiple games, a player using this strategy might respond690
to competitive pressure by increasing their overall bias toward choosing immediately, controlled691
by the c parameter. Increasing c implies a higher likelihood of stopping to claim options with692
lower predicted values (e.g., choosing an option that has not yet been sampled even though its693
predicted value is 0).694
Model 3: Tradeoff. Under the Tradeoff strategy the decision maker simultaneously695
compares the value of an immediate choice versus continuing to explore given the possible696
actions of an opponent. The player’s beliefs about the opponent are represented by two697
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parameters: qopp, the probability that the opponent will stop on each round, and φopp, how698
deterministic his or her choices are with respect to option value. For instance, high qopp means699
the opponent is very likely to stop, but low φopp means the person is not likely to choose the most700
attractive option (in other words, such an opponent is expected to choose “fast and loose”). In701
contrast, low qopp and high φopp means the opponent is less likely to stop on any given round, but702
will tend to choose the best option when they stop. These two parameters determine how703
competition affects the predicted values of both an immediate choice and further exploration.704
If an opponent decides to stop, the probability that they choose option k is705
p(opp chooses k) =
exp(V (k,X) ·φopp)
∑ j∈O exp(V ( j,X) ·φopp)
. (11)
Note that the φopp parameter represents the player’s belief about how deterministically the706
opponent will choose with respect to the predicted option values. A high value of φopp reflects a707
form of pessimism such that the opponent is expected to choose the option with the highest value.708
Consequently, the value of being the second chooser depends on the likely first choice of the709
opponent (under the assumption that the best remaining option will be chosen):710
Vsecond(X) = ∑
k∈O
p(opp chooses k) · [ max
j∈O, j 6=k
V ( j,X)] (12)
The value of choosing on the current round depends on the opponent’s decision as follows.711
If the opponent decides to continue sampling the player is able to choose first. If a tie occurs712
because the opponent also decides to stop, the player is assigned the first or second choice with713
equal probability. Thus, the predicted value of stopping and choosing option k is714
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Vchoose(k,X) = (1−qopp) ·R(k,X) +
qopp · [.5 ·R(k,X) + .5 ·Vsecond(X)] (13)
As in the preceding models, the benefit of exploration is based on the expected outcome of715
drawing an additional sample and then making a choice. Here, however, that benefit must also be716
offset by the costs of competition, both on the current round and the next round. For an option k,717
the value of choosing after observing an additional outcome z is the expected maximum value718
across available options. These values are integrated according to the probability of each outcome719
occurring, and multiplied by the probability of the opponent not stopping. If the opponent stops720
on the current trial (with probability qopp), the player is prevented from exploring further and721





Vchoose( j,X ∪ z)]+
qopp ·Vsecond(X). (14)
Finally, the player simultaneously considers both immediate choices and continued723
exploration, with the probability of each action defined with the softmax choice function:724
p(choose k) =
exp(Vchoose(k,X) ·φ)




∑ j∈O exp(Vchoose( j,X) ·φ)+∑ j∈O exp(Vsample( j,X) ·φ)
. (16)
The Tradeoff model has three parameters. The sensitivity φ reflects how deterministically a725
player acts with respect to predicted value. The remaining parameters represent the player’s726
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beliefs about the opponent’s behavior: the probability that they stop on each round (qopp) and727
their sensitivity (φopp). As in the previous models, these parameters are assumed to be fixed728
within a game. Across multiple games, the effects of competitive pressure on exploration are729
expected to be mediated by changes in these beliefs about opponents (e.g., increasing qopp after730
experiencing an opponent stop first).731
Model Comparison732
Each model was fit to data from Studies 1–3. In addition, a fourth Baseline model was fit733
that assumed a constant stopping probability (a free parameter q), but otherwise random decisions734
on every round. For Studies 1 and 2, we divided the data into an early phase (games 1–4) and a735
late phase (games 5–8) and estimated parameters separately for each phase. Given the findings736
that sample size decreased across rounds, we tested if this shift was reflected in the difference in737
estimated parameters between early and late games. For Study 3, parameters were estimated738
separately for within-pair conditions (1-gain and 3-gains). For the final round of each game we739
only included the decision of the first chooser (since the intended action of the second chooser740
was not available).741
Models were fit through Bayesian estimation using the PyMC Python package (Patil,742
Huard, & Fonnesbeck, 2010)). For each estimated model, chains were run for 20000 samples743
with 2000 burn-in samples. Deviance information criterion (DIC) was used to compare models.744
The prior for stopping probability parameters (q and qopp) was a flat q∼ Beta(1,1) prior. The745
prior for choice sensitivity parameters (φ and φopp) was weakly-informative, φ∼ Gamma(1,10).746
The prior for the bias parameter was a Normal distribution centered on zero with high variance,747
c∼ Normal(0,50). Robustness checks with alternative priors led to convergent results with the748
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settings above.749
Results750
The resulting DIC values are shown in Table 5. In all studies, the Tradeoff strategy was the751
best overall model as indicated by the DIC values. Although in some cases the Constant model752
achieved comparable fits (i.e., both phases of Study 1 and the late phase of Study 2), overall the753
model comparison offers strong support for the Tradeoff strategy.754
The mean posterior estimates and HDIs for the parameters of the Tradeoff strategy are755
shown in Figure 5. Given the decrease in overall sample sizes observed in Studies 1 and 2, we756
examined how the estimated parameters changed from early to late games using the posterior757
distribution of the difference (late − early) for each parameter. Credible differences were assessed758
based on whether the 95% highest-density interval (HDI) for this distribution excluded zero.759
There was a credible increase in qopp (the opponent’s stopping probability) in all three datasets760
(Study 1: M = .1, HDI = [.02, .19]; Study 2, 2 options: M = .22, HDI = [.10, .36]; Study 2, 4761
options: M = .05, HDI = [.01, .08]). There were no credible differences in the φopp parameter762
(Study 1: M = .01, HDI = [−.29, .30]; Study 2, 2 options: M = .10, HDI = [−.21, .44]; Study 2,763
4 options: M = .11, HDI = [−.27, .49]) or the φ parameter (Study 1: M = .01, HDI = [−.08, .10];764
Study 2, 2 options: M =−.01, HDI = [−.05, .04]; Study 2, 4 options: M = .01,765
HDI = [−.04, .04]). These results suggest that the changes in sample size observed across games766
were driven by an increase in perceived competitive pressure, here represented by the belief about767
the likelihood of an opponent stopping on any given trial.768
We conducted the same comparisons for Study 3, in which the 1-gain condition was769
associated with increased sample sizes relative to the 3-gain condition. There was a credible770
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increase in qopp in 3-gain games relative to 1-gain games (M = .15, HDI = [.10, .20]). In771
addition, there was a credible increase in φ in 3-gain games as compared to 1-gain games772
(M = .11, HDI = [.05, .17]). There was not a credible difference in the φopp parameter (M = .12,773
HDI = [−.23, .52]). The effect of option distribution on sample size observed in Study 3 thus774
appears to be due, at least in part, to a difference in the perceived competitive pressure in terms of775
the probability that the opponent will stop (qopp).776
One way to compare participants’ behavior with the estimated models is to examine the first777
decision in each round, at which point participants have observed a single outcome.778
(Comparisons on subsequent rounds are more difficult to visualize given the wide variety of779
outcome sequences experienced by different participants, even by the second round.) We780
examined the proportion of participants who made each of four types of decisions on the first781
round: 1) stop and choose the same option, 2) stop and choose a different option which has not782
yet been sampled, 3) sample again from the same option, and 4) sample from a different option.783
The black lines in Figure 6 indicate for each dataset the proportion of each decision as a function784
of the first observed outcome (binned in order to increase the amount of data in the upper and785
lower extremes). The dashed line and shaded region indicate the mean and 95% HDI of the786
posterior predictive distribution of the probability of each action from the estimated Tradeoff787
model. In general, the model successfully captures the relationship between observed outcomes788
and participants’ decisions on the first round. One notable mismatch is the proportion of 2-option789
participants who chose to switch to sampling a different option. Whereas the model predicts790
similar proportions of sampling either option, participants were somewhat more likely to switch791
to exploring the other option. This may indicate an exploratory “bonus” assigned to options that792
have not yet been explored (Sutton, 1990).793
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Discussion794
Participants from all three studies were best-described by the compensatory Tradeoff795
strategy. It weighs the value of further exploration (i.e., drawing another outcome) against that of796
an immediate, exploitative choice, taking into account the potential costs of a competitor797
choosing first. When separately fitting behavior in the first and second halves of Studies 1 and 2,798
we found an increase in the estimated parameter for the probability of an opponent stopping799
(qopp). This shift reflects the changing value of exploration as competitive pressure increases. As800
participants experience competition (e.g., losing out to an opponent choosing first), they may801
adjust this probability upward, causing the predicted reward from continued exploration to802
decrease relative to that of an immediate choice.803
The Tradeoff model provides a parsimonious account of how beliefs about the choice804
environment and competitors’ behavior jointly affect exploration. The model replicates several805
aspects of the simulation results of Phillips et al. (2014) despite the differences in procedure and806
choice environments. For instance, given a fixed number of competitors, sample sizes are807
predicted to increase with the number of options since there is more to be gained from exploration808
when more options are available. At the same time, fast-acting competitors pose a greater cost809
that may outweigh the benefits of continued exploration, particularly when the number of options810
is small.811
In addition, the model explains why the effect of competition depends on experienced812
outcomes and other properties of the choice environment. Consider Phillips et al.’s finding that813
many choices in their study depended on the valence of the first draw, consistent with a814
“take-good-enough, otherwise-shift” (TGE) heuristic (Phillips et al., 2014). When the first815
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outcome was positive, participants frequently stopped right away and claimed the same option.816
When it was negative, they typically switched to either choose or explore the other (unsampled)817
option. Qualitatively, this heuristic captures some aspects of behavior in the present studies as818
well. Participants in all studies were likely to stop and choose an option when the first draw was819
positive (top row of Figure 6). Note, however, that the reaction to negative outcomes differed820
across studies. In 2-option games, participants frequently responded by immediately choosing the821
other (unsampled) option, whereas in 4-option games they rarely did so, opting instead to822
continue exploring a different option. Moreover, in Study 3, participants more frequently stopped823
to claim an unsampled option after experiencing an extreme negative outcome in the 3-gain824
condition than in the 1-gain condition. It is unclear how to reconcile these differences with a825
single heuristic that ignores these variations in the choice environment. Finally, it is worth noting826
that the TGE heuristic is closely related to the Choice-first model (in that attractive outcomes tend827
to cause immediate choices) which provided a poorer account of the data.828
The success of the Tradeoff model may be related to our participants’ knowledge of the829
choice environment. This environment was also designed to have a simpler probabilistic structure830
than previous incarnations of the sampling paradigm in order to make the value of exploration831
more transparent. If people are ignorant of the number or distribution of outcomes ahead of time832
(as was the case in Phillips et al., 2014), they may be less able to predict the value of continued833
exploration. This might increase reliance on a strategy in which priority is given to stopping834
decisions given based on outcomes that have been experienced so far (as in the Choice-first835
model).836
As an exploratory analysis, our approach involved a number of simplifications that could be837
addressed in further work. Given the small number of games played by each pair of participants,838
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we modeled behavior at the aggregate level, potentially obscuring variability in strategy use839
across pairs. For instance, some pairs had constant sample sizes that did not vary across games or840
as a function of observed outcomes. This behavior may be better described by the Constant model841
if parameters were estimated at the level of individual pairs. In addition, further work is necessary842
to directly test our proposal for how people learn about competitors across repeated games (i.e.,843
by increasing qopp in response to an opponent stopping first). This would likely benefit from a844
larger number of games per pair and a larger option set size to permit for a wider range in sample845
sizes. Finally, the Tradeoff strategy relies on a relatively simple representation of beliefs about846
competitors (qopp and φopp). People may engage in more sophisticated forms of reasoning in847
order to evaluate the risks posed by competitors, including expectations about how competitors848
search (Wilke et al., 2015) or higher levels of iterated reasoning (Ho, Camerer, & Weigelt, 1998;849
Stahl & Wilson, 1995). The Tradeoff model is a first-order iterated reasoning process (Ohtsubo &850
Rapoport, 2006) because it assumes that opponents adopt the Constant strategy. Future work851
could extend the model to investigate how reasoning about others’ exploration affects perceived852
competitive pressure.853
General Discussion854
Exploration is essential for taming uncertainty across many kinds of decision making855
environments (Todd, Hills, & Robbins, 2012). Yet reducing uncertainty through exploration856
rarely comes without costs. Competition for limited resources is one common factor that poses857
costs for the individual who searches or deliberates too long. Given the ubiquity of competitive858
pressure, it is important to understand how people perceive and respond to it when making859
decisions under uncertainty.860
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In agreement with the results of Phillips et al. (2014), people sharply curtailed their861
exploration in the face of competition as compared to solitary players (Study 1). Yet exploration862
also proved sensitive to changes in the environment that affected the degree of competition.863
Specifically, people collected larger samples when the number of available options increased864
(Study 2) and thus the ratio of options to competitors became less fierce. One potential865
explanation for this increased exploration centers on people’s beliefs about how long their866
opponents would explore a larger option set. We examined this further in Study 3 by867
manipulating knowledge of the option EV distribution (varying the relative proportion of gains868
and losses), and by extension, the belief about the competitors’ propensity to search. Sample sizes869
increased when losses became more plentiful. Our model-based analysis suggests that this shift870
resulted from differences in perceived competitive pressure rather than a change in the outcomes871
experienced (i.e., frequent negative outcomes in 1-gain games).872
In contrast to the effects of competitive pressure and option EV distribution, we did not find873
any impact of on-line payoff feedback on exploration in Study 2. In Study 1, participants received874
social feedback indicating whether they succeeded in choosing first but did not learn about their875
decisions’ payoffs, potentially causing them to prioritize stopping first. We expected that876
observing the actual outcomes of their choices might allow people to learn that they were more877
successful at choosing the H option when they experienced a rare outcome. Such insight could878
potentially counteract the downward pressure on sample size from competitive pressure.879
However, providing feedback about the consequences of one’s own choice had no effect on880
sample size; furthermore, providing feedback about both participants’ choices actually led to881
slightly lower sample sizes. This raises the possibility that the provision of full feedback, by882
enabling individuals to compare their performance with their opponents’, may amplify the883
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perceived competitive pressure rather than encourage further exploration (see also Hafenbrädl &884
Woike, 2018).885
Learning to Act Fast: A Race to the Bottom886
The decline in sample size over the course of repeated games suggests that participants887
adjusted how much they explored as a result of experiencing competition. In Studies 1 and 2,888
decreases in sample size were more likely when first choosers had lost out to their opponents in889
the previous trial. The comparison with the Independent condition in Study 1 demonstrates that890
this decline did not result from increasing familiarity or practice with the choice environment or891
mounting opportunity costs imposed by a group experiment. In general, our results suggest a892
“race to the bottom” that reflects a short-term adaptation to competitive pressure. Under this893
process, participants may begin the task with high uncertainty about their opponents’ behavior894
and explore options in a manner similar to that of a solitary participant. As participants895
experience competition, they update their beliefs about their opponents and decrease how much896
they explore. This repeated interaction leads to a feedback loop within a group of competitors,897
causing them to converge toward a strategy of minimal exploration.898
This type of adaptation has also been found in strategic games in which groups of899
competitors converge to stable strategies as a result of experience, both over individual and900
evolutionary time-scales (Avrahami, Güth, Hertwig, Kareev, & Otsubo, 2013; Camerer, 2003;901
Rapoport, Stein, Parco, & Nicholas, 2003). A recent study by Hintze, Phillips, and Hertwig902
(2015) illustrates how a minimal exploration strategy emerges when extreme competition is a903
stable and recurrent property of the ecology. They conducted evolutionary simulations using tasks904
of a similar nature to the rivals-in-the-dark game, with varying levels of competitive pressure.905
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Under direct competition, two agents could explore to learn about the value of a common option906
until deciding between that option and a private alternative of known value (i.e., a sure-thing that907
was not available to the opponent). In an extreme competition condition similar to that of the908
current studies, the two agents could sample and claim either of the two options. The strategy that909
evolved in the direct competition environment was sensitive to environmental variability: agents910
frequently sampled more than once and the likelihood of continuing to sample increased with911
outcome variance. In contrast, the strategy that evolved under extreme competition was a minimal912
one-sample strategy, regardless of the uncertainty in the option value.913
Tomlin, Rand, Ludvig, and Cohen (2015) presented a similar set of findings in the context914
of intertemporal choice. They used a dual-process framework to examine the evolution of915
strategies that combine a fast, automatic component (i.e., immediate consumption of an entire916
resource) and a slow, controlled component (i.e., weighing immediate consumption against saving917
resources for the future). They assumed that when two agents compete for the same resource, an918
agent following an automatic strategy acts faster than an opponent relying on a controlled strategy.919
In the absence of competition, a controlled strategy is advantageous because it enables flexible920
consumption based on an agent’s current state of energy and the availability of resources in the921
environment. In highly competitive environments, however, the stable evolutionary strategy is one922
with a high propensity for fast, automatic responses that reduce the chance of losing out to others.923
These lines of work demonstrate how learning to act fast, even when faced with high degree924
of uncertainty about the quality of the options, can be adaptive. The key is the recurrent presence925
of extreme competition. Accordingly, people’s willingness to explore in social settings may926
depend on the kinds of competition they have experienced in the past. Recent work has suggested927
that manifestations of seemingly impulsive choice may in fact reflect adaptation to stressful or928
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highly uncertain social environments (Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Nettle, 2016; Kidd, Palmeri,929
& Aslin, 2013). In a similar vein, experiencing intense competition for resources in the past (e.g.,930
due to socioeconomic background or experience in a highly competitive industry) may lead to931
less exploration even in contexts in which competitive pressure is eased.932
Implications for Other Social Environments933
We have focused on a relatively austere competitive environment. Individuals were forced934
to stop and choose an option when their opponents terminated search, even when multiple935
additional options were available. In many of the real-world examples of competitive choice that936
we have discussed, people are not mandated to stop exploring at the same time as their937
competitors. However, it is often the case that continuing to search after opponents have stopped938
incurs additional costs, as when opponents gain a competitive edge from their choice which939
affects later interactions (e.g., when a competing company hires an star employee that makes it940
easier to attract additional talent). Although such first-mover advantages are typically examined941
in the context of organizational decision making (e.g., Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), similar942
costs may imply high competitive pressure even when individuals are free to explore943
independently of others.944
Our studies also provided participants with scant information about opponents’ behavior,945
whereas real-world competition often features richer social interactions. Research on behavioral946
ecology has examined competitors’ use of public information, defined as observations of947
competitors’ choices that are used to assess the quality of a resource (Danchin, Giraldeau, Valone,948
& Wagner, 2004). For instance, one advantage of foraging in a group (rather than alone) is that949
the individual can learn about the distribution of resources by observing other group members’950
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search behavior. Although patches of resources are depleted more quickly due to consumption by951
competitors, groups of foragers can use public information to better discern when a patch is952
exhausted and it is time to explore further afield (Valone & Templeton, 2002). Since the rivals-in953
the-dark game separates an initial phase of exploration from a single exploitative choice, public954
information about the final choice could have no effect on exploration in the competitive955
conditions. In the Independent condition in Study 1, the second chooser in each game did observe956
which option was selected by the first chooser, but could also continue exploring to learn about957
either option. Thus, public information about choices is unlikely to have affected behavior in the958
present studies. We would expect it to play a greater role in competitive environments that involve959
ongoing exploitation of a large number of options (Goldstone, Ashpole, & Roberts, 2005).960
In addition to seeing others’ final choices, public information during exploration may offer961
additional benefits. Observing which options an opponent samples (and the frequencies of962
sampling) can provide a signal of their quality even if the actual outcomes are not public. For963
example, if an opponent samples an option once and immediately switches to explore a different964
option, one might infer that they did not experience an especially favorable outcome. Finally,965
observing the outcomes of others’ exploration would lead to obvious benefits in terms of966
estimating option values as well as predicting opponents’ decisions to stop and choose. To take an967
example from the domain of mate search, people exhibit mate-copying behavior such that968
evaluations of potential mates are influenced by observations of their interactions during speed969
dating (Place, Todd, Penke, & Asendorpf, 2010). An important consideration for future work is970
whether competitors prolong exploration when it offers these additional opportunities for social971
learning.972
ADAPTIVE EXPLORATION UNDER COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 50
Conclusions973
For human decision makers, competitive pressure is both ubiquitous and heterogeneous.974
Different environments bring unique tradeoffs between the costs of losing out to opponents and975
the benefits of exploring to reduce uncertainty. Our results suggest that people adapt their976
exploration based on the features of a novel and unfamiliar competitive environment and as a977
result of experiencing competition for finite resources (consistent with a “race to the bottom” over978
the course of repeated play). These findings highlight the need to consider how the social979
dimension of experience, including both past and present exposure to competitive pressure,980
affects how people explore when making decisions under uncertainty.981
Appendix A: Simulating p(H) based on ideal observer model982
An ideal observer model was developed using the Bayesian updating process described in983
the Belief Updating section above, with the additional assumption that the observer984
deterministically chooses the option k with the higher predicted value. Ten-thousand sets of eight985
two-option problems were randomly generated, subject to the constraints that the EV of the two986
options differed by more than 25, the summed EV of the best options was less than 200, and the987
summed EVs of the worst options was greater than −100 (consistent with the procedure of Study988
1). We first evaluated how the proportion of H choices in 2-option problems depended on the989
subset of outcomes experienced by the learner. For each problem we found the predicted choice990
after observing different subsets of outcomes corresponding to each cell of Table 1, with the991
assumption that each outcome is experienced only once. We then calculated the proportion of992
problems for which the model chose option H. Note that there is a small proportion of problems993
where a rare outcome falls within the same range as the common outcomes, and the observer will994
ADAPTIVE EXPLORATION UNDER COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 51
be uncertain about its probability based on a single observation. Thus, the results shown in Table 1995
do not assume that the observer knows whether a particular outcome is rare or common, but996
simply reflects p(H) given at most a single observation of each outcome type for a given problem.997
Our next goal was to assess how p(H) changes with increasing sample size. For each998
problem we randomly generated 100 sets of observations of sample size N, assuming an equal999
likelihood of sampling from options H and L. Model performance for each value of N was1000
measured as the frequency of H choices, averaged across runs and problems. The resulting p(H)1001
is shown by the dashed line in Figure 1C.1002
Appendix B: Bayesian model for dependent options (Study 3)1003
In Study 3, option states were generated according to the condition (1 gain/3 losses; 31004
gains/1 loss). As a result, each observed outcome conveys information about the state of the1005
sampled option as well as the remaining options. For example, in the 1-gain condition, observing1006
a positive outcome from one option leads to a decreased predicted value of the remaining three1007
options (since they are likely to be losses). In the following we describe the Bayesian model that1008
accounts for this dependency between options.1009
The joint hypothesis space S is comprised of all possible combinations of states across four1010
options, S = {(zac ,zar ,zbc ,zbr ,zcc,zcr,zdc ,zdr ) : zkc ∈ Zcommon,zkr ∈ Zrare}. Given a state s ∈ S, each option1011
k is associated with a reward equal to the expected value, Rk(s) = 0.8 · zkc +0.2 · zkr . In Study 3, the1012
condition specifying the proportion of gains and losses determines the prior distribution. Let1013
S1gain be the subset of states for which three options have negative expected values and one option1014
has positive expected value, while S3gain is the subset with the reversed proportion. In the 1-gain1015
condition, the prior probability is then uniformly distributed over states with a single gain,1016




|S1gain| , if s ∈ S1gain,
0, otherwise.
(17)
The prior probability for the 3-gain condition is defined analogously by replacing S1gain with1017
S3gain in Equation 17. The likelihood function is now defined with respect to the individual option:1018
pk(z|s) =

.8, if z = zkc 6= zkr ,
.2, if z = zkr 6= zkc,





Given the subset of outcomes observed so far from sampling each option k,1019
Xk = {z1,z2, . . .}, the posterior probability of each state is determined using Bayes rule,1020
p(s|X) = p(X |s)p(s)
∑s′∈S p(X |s′)p(s′)
, (19)
where p(X |s) =∏k∈O∏z∈Xk pk(z|s) and p(s) is the prior as determined by the experimental1021
condition.1022
Given the posterior distribution over option states, the expected reward of option k is found1023




and the probability of observing a new outcome z ∈ {−200 . .200} if option k is sampled is given1025
by the marginal probability,1026
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p(z|k,X) =∑
s∈S
pk(z|s) · p(s|X). (21)
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Table 1
Probability of obtaining H based on partial outcome experience from two options H and L.
Observed rare outcomes
None H | L H & L
None .5 .81 .99
Observed common outcomes H | L .59 .83 .99
H & L .62 .85 1
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Table 2
Estimated fixed effects from negative binomial regression model of sample size
β 95%-l 95%-u Wald z p
Study 1
Intercept 0.89 0.67 1.10 8.17 < .001
Condition (Competitive) -0.91 -1.32 -0.51 -4.45 < .001
Trial (1-8) 0.05 0.02 0.07 4.09 < .001
Condition × Trial -0.16 -0.22 -0.11 -5.61 < .001
Study 2
Intercept -0.40 -.67 -0.15 -3.03 0.01
Feedback (Partial) 0.09 -0.30 0.50 0.48 0.63
Feedback (Both) -0.02 -0.31 0.28 -0.14 0.89
Number of options (4) 1.05 0.69 1.42 5.75 < .001
Trial (1-8) -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 -10.46 < .001
Feedback (Partial) × Number of options -0.16 -0.74 0.42 -1.13 0.59
Feedback (Both) × Number of options -0.27 -0.74 0.20 -0.53 0.26
Study 3
Intercept 0.21 -0.09 0.49 1.46 0.15
Number of gains (3) -0.25 -0.40 -0.10 -3.18 .001
Trial (1-8) -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -1.26 0.21
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Table 3
Estimated fixed effects from logistic regression model of decrease in sample size across trials in
competitive conditions
β 95%-l 95%-u Wald z p
Study 1
Intercept -1.07 -1.78 -0.42 -3.11 < .001
Trial (2−8) 0.00 -0.18 0.19 0.03 .98
Slowert−1 1.21 0.32 2.13 2.63 .009
Trial × Slowert−1 -0.30 -0.57 -0.04 -2.24 .03
Study 2
Intercept -1.08 -1.40 -0.77 -6.78 < .001
Feedback (Partial) 0.01 -0.25 0.27 0.05 .96
Feedback (Both) -0.01 -0.27 0.24 -0.11 .91
Number of options (4) 0.64 0.42 0.85 5.81 < .001
Trial (2−8) -0.11 -0.18 -0.04 -2.94 .003
Slowert−1 0.82 0.45 1.19 4.36 < .001
Trial × Slowert−1 -0.12 -0.23 -0.01 -2.14 .03
Study 3
Intercept -0.88 -1.43 -0.34 -3.17 .002
Number of gains (3) 0.40 -0.01 0.81 1.90 .06
Trial (2−8) -0.02 -0.16 0.12 -0.28 .78
Slowert−1 0.45 -0.27 1.18 1.23 .22
Trial × Slowert−1 -0.11 -0.32 0.10 -1.06 .29
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Table 4
Estimated fixed effects from logistic regression on probability of choosing H.
β 95%-l 95%-u Wald z p
Study 1
Intercept 0.65 0.28 1.04 3.38 < .001
Condition (Competitive) 0.20 -0.39 0.79 0.65 0.51
Trial (1-8) 0.06 -0.03 0.14 1.38 0.18
Condition × Trial -0.16 -0.29 -0.02 -2.30 0.02
Observed 1+ rare outcomes 0.93 0.61 1.26 5.71 < .001
Study 2
Two options
Intercept 0.34 -0.05 0.87 1.48 0.14
Feedback (Partial) -0.37 -0.98 0.23 -1.12 0.26
Feedback (Full) -0.39 -0.98 0.23 -1.25 0.21
Trial (1-8) 0.02 -0.09 0.12 0.34 0.74
Feedback (Partial) × Trial 0.07 -0.11 0.18 0.87 0.38
Feedback (Full) × Trial 0.04 -0.11 0.18 0.50 0.62
Observed 1+ rare outcomes 1.04 0.49 1.22 6.48 < .001
Four options
Intercept -0.37 -0.81 0.06 -1.62 0.10
Feedback (Partial) -0.17 -0.63 0.50 -0.54 0.59
Feedback (Full) -0.07 -0.63 0.50 -0.24 0.81
Trial (1-8) -0.09 -0.18 0.01 -1.80 0.07
Feedback (Partial) × Trial 0.10 -0.14 0.13 1.34 0.18
Feedback (Full) × Trial -0.01 -0.14 0.13 -0.08 0.94
Observed 1+ rare outcomes 0.79 0.48 1.11 5.79 < .001
Study 3
Intercept -0.61 -1.07 -0.17 -2.66 .01
Number of gains (3) -0.55 -0.97 -0.14 -2.60 0.01
Trial (1-8) 0.00 -0.09 0.09 0.05 0.96
Observed 1+ rare outcomes 1.02 0.61 1.45 4.84 < .001
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Table 5






(4 options) Study 3
Model early late early late early late 1-gain 3-gains
Baseline 1549 1234 3438 2563 8931 7598 4088 3445
Constant 1398 1073 3143 2295 8676 7118 3987 3242
Choice-first 1467 1155 3149 2355 7969 6558 3626 3300
Tradeoff 1394 1070 3113 2291 7709 6333 3508 2924
























Figure 1. A: On each round of the rivals-in-the-dark game the respondent clicks on an option and
observes a randomly generated outcome, then decides whether to continue sampling or to stop
and choose one of the options. B: Binary outcomes for each option were generated by sampling a
common outcome from a uniform distribution bounded by −20 and 20, and sampling a rare
outcome from a uniform distribution bounded by −200 and 200. Common and rare outcomes
occurred with fixed probabilities of .8 and .2, respectively. An illustrative two-option problem is
shown at the bottom, with corresponding outcomes, probabilities, and EVs. C: Probability of
experiencing at least one rare outcome as a function of sample size (black line). Based on
simulated observation sets of varying sample size, the mean performance of a Bayesian ideal
observer begins at approximately .7 for a sample size of 1 and approaches perfect accuracy for
sample sizes larger than 10 (dashed line).
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1st chooser 2nd chooser 1st chooser 2nd chooser
B
Proportion of choices by rank
Independent Competitive
no rare outcomes at least 1 rareoutcome observed all games
Figure 2. Experiment 1 results. A: Mean sample size for the Competitive condition (black line),
all participants in the Independent condition (solid gray line), and for the first stoppers in the
Independent condition (dashed gray line). Error bars indicate standard errors. B: Proportion of
games in which each option was chosen, separated by condition and choice order (1st or 2nd
chooser).
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1st chooser 2nd chooser
4 option games
1st chooser 2nd chooser
B Proportion of choices by rank
at least 1 rare
outcome observed no rare outcomes all games
Figure 3. A: Mean sample size for each condition in Experiment 2. B: Choice proportions by
option rank for the first and second choosers in Experiment 2.
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1st chooser 2nd chooser
3 gains
1st chooser 2nd chooser
B Proportion of choices by rank
at least 1 rare
outcome observed no rare outcomes all games
Figure 4. Experiment 3 results. A: Within-pair differences in mean sample size between the
1-gain and 3-gains conditions. B: Choice performance.


















































early late early late 1-gain 3-gain
Figure 5. Mean parameter values (horizontal lines) and highest density intervals (vertical lines)
from estimated Tradeoff model for each dataset. Parameters were estimated separately for early
games (1–4) and late games (5–8) from each experimental condition.










Figure 6. Comparison of participants’ actions and predictions of the Tradeoff model on the first
round, as a function of the first observed outcome. Black lines indicate the proportion of rounds
in which participants chose each action (sample same, sample other, choose same, choose other).
Gray lines and regions indicate the mean and 95% HDI of the probability of each action based on
posterior simulation from the estimated Tradeoff model.
